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The E Block plan increases social welfare and likely auction revenues 
•  Verizon and AT&T earn substantial scarcity rents from holding nearly all of the original low-
frequency Cellular licenses, which gives them operational and quality advantages reflected in 
their prices and profits.  
Verizon and AT&T are much better in revenues and additions 
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•  The 700 MHz spectrum has high “foreclosure value” to Verizon and AT&T, separate from 
the true “economic value” of building and operating a network. Market entry by new 700 
MHz bidders threatens their incumbent position. Verizon and AT&T will defend their 
position and they have the capital to do so.  
•  The high foreclosure value to Verizon and AT&T deters new entrants from participating in 
the auction, reducing bidder competition and driving down auction revenues. New entrants 
rationally stay away from an auction when the costs of participating outweigh the expected 
profits. In this case, the incumbent advantage reduces the chance the entrant will win and 
reduces the entrant’s profits if it does enter and win. Moreover, the FCC’s auction format 
makes it especially easy for Verizon and AT&T to prevent entry of a nationwide player. 
Participation is discouraged and the absence of new competitors allows incumbents to win 
licenses at very low prices. 
•  An open access, wholesale E Block, combined with bidding credits, will increase auction 
revenues. These rules draw new entrants into the auction to compete with the incumbent   2
bidders, creating greater bidder competition and causing winning bids to reflect the economic 
value of the spectrum.  
Network Sharing will enable bidders to pay more for the E Block 
•  Secondary use of the public safety spectrum during non-emergency times makes more 
efficient use of the spectrum, enabling the E Block winner to pay more. 
Nationwide license will attract bidders with a nationwide business model 
•  A nationwide license will eliminate the exposure problem—the problem of a nationwide 
bidder winning some but not all of what it needs. This will motivate participation of 
nationwide entrants and also enable them to bid higher. 
•  Spectrum in the other bands is auctioned in smaller licenses to accommodate the interests of 
small bidders and regional bidders. 
Competitive nationwide roaming will increase the value of smaller licenses 
•  Guaranteed access to nationwide coverage increases value of other blocks to small and 
regional carriers.  
•  Competitive rates for roaming promotes and sustains entry and participation in the market.  
The E Block plan is narrowly-tailored to assure a competitive auction 
•  Verizon and AT&T, as well as other bidders, will still have ample spectrum to purchase 
spectrum under a non-open business model (50 MHz of the 60 MHz being auctioned). 
An open E Block does not discourage participation from Verizon and AT&T 
•  The open E Block motivates the entry that is necessary to assure a competitive auction, and 
competitive revenues across all the blocks.  
•  Without the open E Block, Verizon and AT&T would dominate the auction. Potential bidders 
and investors would know this and rationally decide not to participate. Auction revenues 
would be low.   3
Some Real World Examples of How the FCC Rules Help (or Hurt) 
Consumer Welfare and Auction Revenues 
Example 1: Foreclosing entry 
In Auction 35, Verizon, Cingular and AT&T all bid for the three 10-MHz licenses that were for 
sale in January 2001. Verizon already had spectrum in New York City, but Cingular had none. 
Verizon won two of the three licenses by paying over $2 billion per license ($11.40/MHz-pop), 
thereby excluding Cingular from New York City. AT&T won the third and it too already had 
spectrum in NYC. Verizon and AT&T thus protected and enhanced their dominant position. 
Example 2: Discouraging potential entry 
Before the first broadband PCS auction, PacTel’s CEO and its auction advisor discouraged 
competition for the LA license by explaining publicly that PacTel would win it regardless of who 
else bid or how high they bid. Despite Craig McCaw’s bidding, the license still sold for well 
below its economic value, thus reducing the Treasury’s revenue. 
Example 3: Motivating participation 
In the European 3G auctions, auctions with rules designed to encourage new entry generated 
more revenues than those that did not. For example, the UK created a fifth license not available 
to the four existing incumbents. The presence of this fifth license motivated participation, 
increasing bid activity and leading to high auction revenues.  
Example 4: Discouraging competition 
AT&T repeatedly engaged in retaliatory bidding in the DEF auction (Auction 11), making it 
clear that:  
1. AT&T would win the licenses it sought; and  
2. AT&T would punish those that bid against it.  
As a result of this strategy, AT&T paid significantly less for the spectrum it won. 
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There have been several comments that criticize auction rules that prevent the two major 
low-frequency incumbents from winning all of the newly available spectrum and incorporating it 
into their proprietary networks. Such rules include new-entrant set-asides, new-entrant bidding 
credits, and the open access plan. We disagree with these criticisms and argue that given the 
current market structure, such rules are likely to improve welfare and auction revenues. We are 
submitting this report to provide sound economic analysis of these claims. 
For example, a recent CTIA-sponsored report makes very strong claims when it states that 
“Limiting the entities that bid in an auction is a bad idea under almost any circumstances” and 
“Moreover, limiting the number of bidders would almost surely decrease the intensity of 
competition, which would decrease auction proceeds.”
 2 
While viscerally appealing, the strength of the CTIA economists’ statement is surely 
overdone, and under current circumstances, probably wrong. In fact, limiting auction 
participation appropriately can increase revenues, and more importantly, it can increase 
consumer welfare and total social welfare. The explanation is straightforward—it is up to the 
FCC as the auction designer to represent the interests of consumers who otherwise are not 
directly nor well represented in the auction. This is the conclusion developed in a large body of 
economic and auction literature. It is also supported by overwhelming evidence from the 
experiences of countries worldwide with spectrum auctions over the last 13 years. We elaborate 
on the literature and auction experience later in this paper. 
The reason that limiting participation can increase revenues and social welfare is simple—
incumbents have profits to protect, and entrants realize this, so rationally the potential entrants 
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stay away from the auction because the high costs of participating outweigh the low odds that 
they will win. Thus the incumbents win in two ways: they protect their profits and they get the 
new licenses for scarce spectrum at low prices.  
In a follow-up to the CTIA-sponsored report, Hahn and Singer (2007) argue that the FCC 
rule-making process is a rent-seeking game in which Frontline Wireless is a lead player, and 
somehow the incumbent companies are innocent by-standers in this process, and therefore 
Congress should step in and eliminate the FCC’s discretion. We strongly disagree with this 
characterization, unsupported by any economic argument or empirical fact. In contrast, there is 
centuries of empirical evidence that incumbents engage in rent-seeking within government and 
that it is incumbents, not entrants, that receive the lions’ share of the benefits of this rent-seeking 
behavior, at the expense of consumers.
 Moreover, it is the FCC, not Congress, that is best-suited 
to weigh the complex tradeoffs of auction and service rules for particular auctions. The best that 
Congress can do—and has done—is establish the goals that should guide the FCC in its rule-
making process.  
We explain the underlying economic concepts in Section 1. Additionally, we consider in 
Section 2 the other revenue effects, including the Network Sharing proposal under consideration 
by the FCC. Network Sharing will lead to a reduction of the social cost of building out the public 
safety network. Any potential drop in revenue should be much less than the cost of building the 
public safety network independently. 
Our views on this issue are based on long-established economic principles, a well-developed 
theory of auctions, decades of empirical confirmation of the theory, our experience helping 
governments design auctions (including the design of the simultaneous ascending auction used 
by the FCC), and helping firms to bid in nearly all major spectrum auctions around the world. 
Pro-competitive rules to increase social welfare could include bidding credits, set asides, 
spectrum caps, or an open-access mandate. 
Although we focus on auction revenues in this paper, we wish to emphasize that we do not 
believe that revenues should be the primary goal of the FCC in the 700 MHz or any of its other 
auctions. Nonetheless, to the extent that raising taxpayer revenues is a goal in the auction design, 
we show that the E Block proposal is fully consistent with this objective, as well as other 
objectives, such as efficiency, competition, and innovation. 
1  Open access is likely to increase auction revenues 
Experience and economic theory show that rules to promote competition on the E Block are 
likely to have beneficial effects from the standpoint of auction revenue and consumer welfare. 
To explain our reasoning we start with a simple model that shows how the presence of 
incumbent bidders can reduce social welfare. Then we present a fuller model. Appendix A 
develops detailed models that provide firm theoretical support for these ideas.
3 In addition to the 
                                                 
3 The theory we present here is not new. The application of auction theory to bidding credits and set-asides is 
developed in Ayres and Cramton (1996). Our basic model is based on Jehiel and Moldovanu (2003). Similar 
arguments of how set-asides and bidding credits help improve revenue are presented in Milgrom (2004). Cramton 
(2002) and Klemperer (2002) also argue that the incumbent bias, which makes it clear who will be the ultimate 
winners in the ascending auction, reduces competition in the auction and dramatically reduces revenues. Both cite 
the European experience.   3
theoretical models, we point to several examples from recent spectrum auctions in both the U.S. 
and in Europe where the evidence shows that incumbents’ dominant role reduced competition in 
the auctions and thereby reduced revenues. 
1.1  The basic deficiency of an auction with incumbents bidding against entrants 
First we review the simplest case, where the ideas are abundantly clear. Suppose that an 
incumbent monopolist already has one license, and now a second license is to be sold in an 
auction. Assume that a new entrant has greater economic value for the second license than the 
incumbent does. This is often the case, since an operator’s value for additional spectrum 
typically falls with additional spectrum—operators tend to have downward sloping demand 
curves for spectrum. However, the incumbent enjoys monopoly rents that it wants to retain. 
Under nearly any economic model, entry would reduce monopoly rents and hence the 
monopolist’s profit. The incumbent’s license valuation is its economic value plus the foreclosure 
value (which is the loss of incumbent’s oligopoly rents were an entrant to win that license)—that 
is, the incumbent’s valuation includes the value of deterring entry. 
Under these assumptions, the incumbent monopolist will win the license (thereby blocking 
entry), even though the new entrant is more efficient, whenever the entrant’s efficiency 
advantage is less than the incumbent’s loss of monopoly rents were it to fail to deter entry. The 
greater are the monopoly rents, and hence the worse the monopoly problem is, the more likely it 
is that the incumbent wins. 
This is the great deficiency of an unrestricted auction when incumbents have rents to protect. 
Symmetric auctions among asymmetric bidders are prone to inefficient outcomes because the 
interests of consumers are not directly represented in the auction—the responsibility to promote 
consumers’ interests resides with the FCC when it designs the auction, which inevitably will 
shape the structure of the industry far into the future. 
As an example where an incumbent was able to forestall entry, in Auction 35 Verizon, 
Cingular and AT&T all bid for the three 10-MHz licenses that were for sale in January 2001. 
Verizon already had spectrum in New York City, but Cingular had none. Verizon won two of the 
three licenses by paying over $2 billion per license ($11.40/MHz-pop), thereby excluding 
Cingular from New York City. AT&T won the third and it too already had spectrum in NYC. 
AT&T and Verizon thus protected and enhanced their duopoly.
4 
1.2  The costs of participating in the auction can reduce competition and further 
reduce revenue 
The first model above assumed that there were no costs to participate in an auction. 
However, auction participation costs can be substantial—months of senior management time to 
prepare for and bid in the auction, fees for consultants, regulatory counsel, and other professional 
services, and the interest payments on upfront payments all contribute to the costs to participate. 
The expectation of incurring these costs can affect an entrant’s decision about whether to 
participate in the auction. In particular, whenever an entrant knows that an incumbent’s loss of 
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monopoly rents exceeds the entrant’s efficiency advantage, a potential entrant rationally decides 
not to participate in the auction, even if the entrant has higher economic value for the license. As 
a result, auction revenues are extremely low. 
PacTel’s pre-auction strategy in bidding for a Los Angeles license in March 1995 
(Auction 4) shows exactly how this can work. PacTel’s CEO and its auction advisor discouraged 
competition for the LA license by explaining publicly that PacTel would win it regardless of who 
else bid or how high they bid.
5 Only Craig McCaw bid against PacTel and thus prevented the 
sale of one of the most valuable licenses from selling at its reserve price. Despite McCaw’s 
bidding, the license still sold for well below its economic value and thus reduced the Treasury’s 
revenue. 
1.3  Revenue is reduced when incumbents dominate the auction 
The European 3G auctions provide other examples of weak competition when incumbents 
are expected to win the available licenses. In those auctions, prices varied greatly, depending on 
whether the number of licenses available was equal to or greater than the number of licenses that 
incumbents were allowed to win. It may seem odd that increasing the number of licenses (and 
thus increasing supply and thereby seeming to reduce scarcity) will increase prices. In fact, 
however, when the number of available licenses equaled the number of licenses incumbents were 
allowed to win, prices were low in the European 3G auctions precisely because potential entrants 
realized that participation in the auction would be costly and unlikely to be successful. However, 
when there were licenses that were guaranteed to go to new entrants, the value of participating 
increased substantially and potential entrants drove up prices to levels substantially more than in 
the less competitive incumbent-only auctions. Klemperer (2004) discusses exactly this problem 
in the UK auctions and the reason that the UK ultimately decided to have 5 licenses when there 
were 4 incumbents and to have one of the five licenses reserved for a non-incumbent. Moreover, 
he concludes with the caution that: 
[T]he most important features of an auction are its robustness against collusion 
and its attractiveness to potential bidders. Failure to attend to these issues can 
lead to disaster. Furthermore, anyone setting up an auction would be foolish to 
follow past successful designs blindly; auction design is not ‘one size fits all.’ 
1.4  Highest and best use of the spectrum for the public benefit requires auction 
design 
Jehiel and Moldovanu (2003) conduct a similar analysis of all the 3G auctions in Europe. 
They caution: 
[T]he often repeated maxim ‘Put the objects in the hand of those who value 
them most’ is not a good guide for policy purposes, since the valuations of the 
bidders may come at the expense of other parties. If the externalities are due to 
market structure considerations, the notion of economic efficiency should not 
be solely based on considerations about firms’ welfare; consumers’ welfare 
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should also be taken into account since it will be affected differently by the 
various possible outcomes of the auction. Since consumers usually do not 
participate in the auction, there is little hope that an auction design that does 
not explicitly incorporate their concerns will generate a high total welfare. 
Specifically, there is a risk that firms will use the auction as an instrument to 
increase market power, to the detriment of consumers. [emphasis added] 
And their summary and conclusion state: 
Since the main goal of most spectrum allocation procedures is economic 
efficiency, and since consumers (who are affected by the ensuing market 
structure) do not participate at the auction stage, good designs must alleviate 
the asymmetry among incumbents and potential entrants by actively 
encouraging entry. 
Reasonable indicators of the auctions’ success need to include the expected 
degree of competitiveness in the market structure shaped at the auction stage. 
Milgrom (2004, pp. 234-235) states: 
In major asset sales and large procurements, it is typically very costly to 
prepare bids. When the likely winner of the auction is not in much doubt, the 
prospect of incurring unrecoverable costs can depress entry. Spectrum auctions 
in Germany, Italy, Israel and Switzerland have all suffered from insufficient 
entry. (…) 
In this section, we show how a seller can structure an auction to encourage 
entry, increase competition and promote higher prices. (…) We present several 
tactics for increasing participation. The first tactic is the use of bidding credits 
and set-asides, as studied by Ayres and Cramton (1996). 
A cogent summary of the European experience is shown in Figure 1. The first country to 
conduct a 3G auction was the UK and it structured its auction in a way that guaranteed at least 
one new entrant to win a license. The auction attracted 13 bidders and very high revenues.
6 In 
contrast, the Dutch auction, even though seemingly following the UK auction rules, allowed the 
incumbents to capture all the spectrum and resulted in much lower revenues. The German 
auction allowed up to two new entrants and made it extremely likely that there would be at least 
one. It resulted again in large competition and a new entrant winning a license. As time 
progressed three factors contributed to the reduction of revenues. First, the stock market 
valuations of the wireless businesses dropped, reducing the value of licenses. Second, it became 
clearer who were the leading wireless firms in Europe as a result of the previous auctions. Third, 
some of the countries adopted auction rules that allowed incumbents to win all the licenses. Even 
though the aggregate conditions changed, the auction designs had major impacts on auction 
revenues. For example, the embarrassingly low revenues in Switzerland are commonly attributed 
to the faulty design that led to no competition in the auction and sale at the low reserve price.
7 
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Figure 1. If it is clear who will win then only winners participate 















































Greater clarity about who will win
Sequence of auctions  
1.5  Predation to deter entry 
Finally, in the FCC’s DEF auction (Auction 11), AT&T repeatedly engaged in retaliatory 
bidding, making it clear that: 1) AT&T would win the licenses it sought; and 2) AT&T would 
punish those that bid against it. The outcome was that other bidders avoided AT&T’s preferred 
license, placing substantially higher bids on identical licenses, rather than bidding on the cheaper 
license “claimed” by AT&T. Figure 2 below shows that bidders were significantly more likely to 
bid on the more expensive but identical licenses if AT&T held the lower priced license than if 
smaller bidders held the less expensive license (Cramton and Schwarz 2002). 
Figure 2. AT&T effectively used retaliatory bidding in Auction 11 
 






Test Statistic for 
Comparison of Means 
Other Block is 25% More Expensive       
Number of Bids on Other Block 140  16   
Number of Bids on Less Expensive Block 307  71   
Percent Bid on Other Block 31.3%  18.4%  2.75 
      
Other Block is 50% More Expensive       
Number of Bids on Other Block 73  7   
Number of Bids on Less Expensive Block 203  41   
 Percent Bid on Other Block 26.5%  14.6%  2.07 
Notes: 
1The five smaller bidders are ACCPCS, Comcast, Rivgam, PAccess, Touch, each of whom won 
between 9 and 14  licenses. AT&T won 223 licenses.   7
1.6 Concerns  and  remedies 
As we discussed in our earlier report, Verizon and AT&T earn substantial scarcity rents 
from holding nearly all the low-frequency 800 MHz cellular licenses. These licenses give them 
coverage advantages due to lower costs of build-out in less densely populated areas and higher 
reliability of service in more urbanized areas. As a result Verizon and AT&T realize higher 
revenues per minute, attract more new customers as evidenced by significantly higher net 
customer additions, and have lower churn. Verizon and AT&T have a strong interest in 
maintaining that advantage. Figure 3 below shows how Verizon and AT&T had much higher 
revenues per minute and much higher net subscriber additions in the fourth-quarter of 2006 than 
the two high-frequency nationwide competitors. 
Figure 3. Verizon and AT&T are much better in revenues and additions 






























Source: Merrill Lynch, Global Wireless Matrix  
However, their advantages are threatened by the 700 MHz spectrum that provides another 
band of frequencies with which to compete. According to the models presented, and supported 
by the historical evidence, Verizon and AT&T have an incentive to forestall entry in the 700 
MHz band. And the ascending auction mechanism provides them with tools to do so. To repeat, 
the incumbent’s license valuation is its economic value plus the foreclosure value, which is the 
loss of incumbent’s oligopoly rents were an entrant to win that license. 
It is common knowledge that AT&T and Verizon have incumbent positions to protect. The 
consequences are especially acute in capital markets. Entrants have limited access to capital, 
even for the purpose of bidding in the auction, because an unsuccessful bid costs time and 
money. Some small bidders, especially affiliates of Verizon and AT&T, might win some small 
licenses, but absent some remedy from the FCC, Verizon and AT&T are likely to win all the 700 
MHz licenses that might threaten their duopoly rents. They will have successfully foreclosed 
entry if they succeed in deterring bidding by any nationwide entrant. And then auction revenues 
likely will be low.   8
There are several remedies for this: spectrum caps, set-asides, bidding credits, and an open 
access requirement. At the very minimum, we propose two simple remedies: 
1.  Establish open access and wholesale rules on a nationwide license for the E Block 
(possibly with some anti-concentration rules); and 
2.  Provide bidding credits (without a retail service provision mandate, but possibly with 
provisions to prevent unjust enrichment).
 
These requirements provide strong motivation for new nationwide entrants (as in the UK 3G 
auction) to bid in the auction. While it still would be possible for the two major incumbents to 
acquire the spectrum by bidding high enough, these remedies ensure that there would be 
competition for the license and that if the incumbent were to acquire it then there would be some 
additional retail competition. Moreover, as we discussed in our earlier report, these remedies are 
limited to 10 MHz of the 60 MHz for auction in the 700 MHz band; thus the parties will have 
ample opportunity to pursue alternative business plans using the remainder of the band. 
2  Other revenue impacts 
In this section we discuss the other revenue impacts from various proposals: the public-
private partnership, the nationwide license, and the wholesale roaming obligations. 
2.1  Network Sharing will enable bidders to pay more for the E Block 
The public-private network sharing and buildout obligation would impact auction revenues 
in two main ways: by giving the E Block licensee the opportunity to use commercially unused 
public safety bandwidth and by requiring the E Block licensee to pay for the buildout of the 
public safety network. The Network Sharing proposal gives secondary use rights on the public 
safety spectrum to the E Block licensee. These secondary rights increase the effective spectrum 
available and therefore they will be reflected in bidders’ valuations for the E Block and hence 
increase revenues. 
On the other hand, the Network Sharing proposal gives the public safety agencies access to 
the private part of the spectrum in case of emergency. Depending on how that access will be 
priced this will somewhat reduce auction valuations, but to the later benefit of the public safety 
agencies. We think that the net effect on revenue will still be positive, because the public safety 
agencies will use all of their capacity relatively rarely—though when it does, it will be extremely 
valuable, saving lives. 
2.2  Revenue impact must be considered in the overall fiscal context 
The second main effect on the valuations of the network is that the E Block licensee will be 
required to build out with its own funds the public safety network. This cost will be reflected in 
lowered valuations. The net effect of this reduction and the increase discussed above can be 
either positive or negative. 
In either case, there are two important things to keep in mind. First, because the nation needs 
to build the public safety network in this or some other way, the cost of building it has to be paid 
by the taxpayers, and using indirectly the auction proceeds to finance the network is less 
distortionary than using taxes. Second, since the E Block licensee will be building out the   9
commercial network at the same time, there will be important economies of scope that make the 
incremental cost of building the public safety network much smaller than if the two networks 
were built separately. Because these economies of scope will be translated into auction prices, 
they allow the nation to achieve the public safety network at a lower cost than the cost of 
independent construction, even if this cost could be covered by some federal funding or as a 
result of coordination of different public safety agencies with independent funding. 
2.3  Nationwide license will attract bidders with a nationwide business model 
One of the important features of the E Block is that a nationwide license will promote a 
nationwide interoperable public safety network and a nationwide open platform for innovation 
and roaming. But the nationwide license will also have beneficial revenue effects. One of the 
biggest concerns with the FCC’s simultaneous ascending auction has been the “exposure” 
problem. When firms are faced with exposure risk, the risk of not aggregating all of the pieces of 
a package when the package is worth more than the sum of its parts, firms tend to reduce their 
bids, or even decline to participate in the auction. 
The evidence from the AWS auction supports the notion that aggregation risk is real and that 
bidders reduced bidding to avoid exposure. The premium for the large REAG licenses was 45% 
in the AWS auction. We think that the aggregation premium will be present in the 700 MHz 
auction and that starting with a nationwide license will increase auction revenues accordingly. 
2.4  Competitive nationwide roaming will increase the value of smaller licenses 
Smaller bidders will be more likely to participate in the auction to acquire local coverage on 
other blocks when they know in advance that nationwide roaming will be available on non-
discriminatory terms. The end result will be a much more competitive auction across the board. 
Ultimately, this will lead to higher revenues from the auction, and greater efficiency in the 
wireless market thereafter. 
3 Conclusion 
One of the most important features of an auction is how the rules are designed. In this case, 
that means the design of the auction rules and the service rules to ensure that there is competition 
in the auction and room for competition after the auction. If the FCC does not take both of these 
sets of rules into account when designing the auction, it risks reducing both social welfare and 
auction revenues. 
We think that the simple rules mandating open access and wholesale on a limited amount of 
the spectrum will provide for a robust increase in competition that will benefit consumers and 
taxpayers. However, unless it ensures that the post-auction market will be competitive, the FCC 
risks both consumer welfare and auction proceeds. 
Critiques of the E Block plan, such as Faulhaber et al. (2007) and Hahn and Singer (2007), 
mischaracterize the E Block plan as a spectrum grab by rent-seeking new entrants, and argue for 
no remedies to the obvious and clear incentives that the low-frequency incumbents, Verizon and 
AT&T, have to prevent efficient entry. These authors apparently want the FCC to surrender its 
obligation to establish service and auction rules that promote the public interest. Of course, the 
FCC should do no such thing. Rather, the FCC should examine the substantial economic theory,   10
auction theory, and empirical evidence, and make a reasoned determination based on what is best 
for consumers, taxpayers, and social welfare. By these measures, the E Block plan does very 
well indeed.   11
Appendix A 
Models of Competition in Auctions with Incumbents 
This appendix presents several simple models of competition in auctions with incumbents 
and new entrants. The following are based on the models and analyses in Jehiel and Moldovanu 
(2003). 
Model 1: Effects of Restrictions on Incumbents 
Suppose first that there is one additional license up for a sale via an ascending auction. 
Before the auction there is one incumbent in the industry who already owns M licenses. Suppose 
that after the auction, if there are k firms then the profit per license will be Profit(k). Thus 
Profit(1) is the monopoly profit per license and Profit(2) is the duopoly profit per license. We 
assume throughout that Profit(k) is a decreasing function of the number k of firms, and that social 
welfare and consumer surplus are increasing in k. This assumption is a standard implication of 
every reasonable model of industry competition. Essentially, competition transfers existing 
profits from firms to consumers, and yields overall efficiency gains from expanded demand due 
to lower prices. 
We assume that there are many potential entrants. We compare the following two scenarios: 
A: the incumbent and entrants bid on equal terms. 
B: the incumbent is not allowed to bid for the new license. 
Jehiel and Moldovanu (2003) illustrate the results of such an auction. In scenario A the 
incumbent would win the new license at a price pA that is no more than Profit(2) and there would 
remain only the single monopoly firm in the industry. In scenario B the license price would be at 
least as high, pB ≥ pA , while the market outcome would be more efficient because both social 
welfare and consumer surplus would be higher with two firms. 
To see the first claim, notice that a new entrant is willing to bid p for the license only if 
Profit(2) − p ≥ 0. Now, if the incumbent does not win the license then the incumbent obtains the 
total profit from Profit(2) per existing license, of which it owns M. Alternatively, if the 
incumbent wins then it obtains profit Profit(1) − p on the new license and retains its profits from 
its other licenses. The additional profit for the incumbent from winning the new license, as 
compared to losing it, is therefore 
V = (M+1)·Profit(1) − p − M·Profit(2)  .     (*) 
The first term is the profit from being the monopolist with M+1 licenses, the second term p 
is the cost of the new license, and the third term (an ‘opportunity cost’) is the profit for the 
incumbent with M licenses when there is a second firm in the market. 
An alternative way of writing equation (*) is to write it as: 
V = Profit(2) − p + (M+1)·[Profit(1)-Profit(2)] 
Where in the last term, Profit(1)-Profit(2) is a precise measure of the incumbent’s Monopoly 
Rent per license on all M+1 licenses if it succeeds in deterring entry. This expression gives a 
mathematical basis for the claim we made in the main text that incumbents are willing to bid   12
more than entrants to protect their existing profits. The larger those are, the more V deviates from 
the true value of the license, which is Profit(2). 
If the auction’s final price p is less than the incumbent’s valuation, which is  
ValueINC = Profit(2) + (M+1)·[Incumbent’s Monopoly Rent per license], 
then the incumbent’s additional profit V will be positive and the incumbent wins the license. 
Therefore, at any price such that an entrant would find it profitable to win the license, the 
incumbent would have even higher net profit from winning because it wants also to prevent the 
loss in monopoly rents were it to fail to deter entry. The entrants would drop out of the ascending 
auction no later than at the price p = Profit(2) and possibly sooner (see the next model for a 
sharper characterization of the price). This scenario results in the incumbent retaining its 
monopoly. 
In the second scenario, the potential entrants would bid the price up to Profit(2). That would 
result in at least as high revenues and a more competitive post-auction market structure. 
Admittedly, this model (as well as the models below) is very stylized and does not do justice 
to the full complexity of spectrum auctions, where players are asymmetric (beyond the 
asymmetry between entrants and incumbents), have private information about their business 
plans and cost structures, and the value of additional licenses is not necessarily linear in the 
number of licenses (because of complementarities among different blocks or because of 
decreasing marginal values of additional licenses). 
This simple model is intended only to highlight the incumbent bias in auctions that can lead 
to an inefficient allocation of the licenses (in the sense of inefficient post-auction market 
structure). Further, it highlights that revenues in unrestricted auctions are no higher than in 
auctions with incumbents restricted from acquiring all licenses. However, the model does shed 
light on the behavior and outcomes that occurred in spectrum auctions with dominant 
incumbents, as reported in the main text. 
One possible criticism is that the model assumes only one incumbent, while there are two 
low-frequency incumbents in the U.S. In the case of only one license up for auction when there 
are two incumbents, one expects that competition between the two incumbents would drive 
prices up: even though without restrictions the market outcome would be still inefficient, at least 
revenues would be much higher (Profit(2) instead of Profit(3) if incumbents are not allowed). 
However, this scenario is also inconsistent with the upcoming auction, in which there will be 
more licenses available than the number of low-frequency incumbents. In this case, the 
incumbents can simply split the market and each pay the price = Profit(3) instead of Profit(2) per 
license, resulting again in both low efficiency and revenues.
8 
Model 2: Small Auction Participation Costs 
Now, in addition to the setup of Model 1, suppose that there is a small cost c to participate in 
the auction and that firms differ in their profits per license, that is, 
Profiti(k) ≠ Profitj(k) 
                                                 
8 This is what happened in the German 1999 spectrum auction. For a model that explains that this is the unique 
equilibrium outcome see Grimm, Riedel and Wolfstetter (2003).   13
where i and j represent different firms. It is realistic to assume that these differences are large 
compared to c but small compared to the effect of the market structure: Profiti(k) > Profitj(k+1) 
for all i and j. The differences between Profiti(k) ≠ Profitj(k) are assumed to be private 
information before the auction. Additionally, the auctioneer sets a small minimum reserve price 
PMIN such that PMIN < Profiti(2) for every bidder i. 
Again consider two scenarios: 
A: the incumbent and entrants bid on equal terms. 
B: the incumbent is not allowed to bid for the new license. 
This game is more difficult to analyze because of the entry decision. To simplify things, 
suppose that other than the incumbent there are two potential entrants, and that c is small enough 
that if faced only with competition from another entrant, each entrant is willing to pay the entry 
cost c.
9 
What is the equilibrium outcome now? Subsequent to the firms’ entry decisions, the game is 
as in Model 1. But now in scenario A the entrants realize that competition is futile and hence are 
strictly better off not to enter, resulting in an inefficient market outcome and minimal revenue 
PMIN for the Treasury. In scenario B the entrants enter and auction revenue is equal to the 
minimum of their Profiti(2). Hence the restriction improves both efficiency and revenue! 
Summing up, small entry costs, or small information asymmetries related to common value, 
especially if these are exacerbated by incumbents having better knowledge of the industry, can 
turn the incumbent bias of auctions into disastrously low revenues. 
We are not the first ones to point out this implication. For example, Jehiel and Moldovanu 
(2003) write: 
If potential new entrants perceive this disadvantage,
10 they might not bother to 
bid at all, or they might try to form consortia with incumbents. Both types of 
behaviour were observed and are likely to have an adverse effect on 
competitiveness and revenue. The need to attract entrants is the main concern 
of Klemperer (2000) and (2001). 
Model 3: Open access 
The wholesale open access requirement that we recommend can be perceived as a restriction 
on the ability of the two low-frequency incumbents to obtain all blocks in the auction for 
inclusion in their proprietary networks. Hence it will yield the benefits illustrated by the two 
models above. But does it have any benefits beyond creating an implicit set-aside for new 
entrants? This is an important question, since if the answer were no then a simple restriction on 
the two low-frequency incumbents that does not allow them to acquire all the blocks available in 
the upcoming auction may serve efficiency better. 
                                                 
9 For a similar model, see Milgrom (2004) section 6.3.1. 
10 “Klemperer (2000) points out that small perceived advantages (‘toeholds’) can be transformed into large 
advantages during the auction due to cautious behaviour in order to avoid the ‘winner’s curse’.” (footnote 28 in 
Jehiel and Moldovanu (2003).   14
To see how the open access requirement can affect revenue, consider the following stylized 
model. 
There are two new licenses for sale. There is one incumbent with one existing license and 
many potential entrants. Some of them are national entrants and some of them are regional 
entrants. For simplicity, assume that licenses can be split into two regions, and that there are at 
least two potential entrants per region. 
Now, suppose that the profit to a national license is Profit(k) if there are k firms in the 
industry, where each regional entrant is counted as 1/2 of a firm. The profit of a regional license 
depends on k and also on the existence of the open-access network that allows the regional firms 
to offer nationwide service. In particular, the profits of a regional firm R are ProfitR(k, Open) if 
the open-access is available and ProfitR(k, Closed) if it is not, with ProfitR(k, Open)> ProfitR(k, 
Closed) due to the absence of assured roaming at non-discriminatory prices. Assume that 
  2 ·ProfitR(k, Open) > Profit(k) > 2·ProfitR(k, Closed). 
This condition states that the regional firms are more efficient in their regions than the 
national licensees if and only if they have nationwide access that they can combine with their 
local offerings. 
Now, consider the following three scenarios: 
A: Both licenses are offered as national licenses and the incumbent has the right to acquire 
both of them. 
B: One license is set-aside for a new entrant and one is not, but no open-access requirement 
is imposed. The unrestricted license is split into two regions. 
C: Like in scenario B but with an open-access requirement on the restricted nationwide 
license. 
In scenarios B and C, assume that no firm is allowed to win both national licenses. 
Following the analysis above, the outcomes in these three scenarios will be: 
A: The incumbent captures both licenses at prices no more than Profit(2) each. 
B: One license will be captured by a new entrant at the price = Profit(2) and the other one by 
the incumbent at the price = Profit(3). Thus the restriction improves efficiency but it decreases 
revenues somewhat. 
However, if bidders must pay a small entry cost to participate in the action (like in Model 2 
above) then there will be competition for the first license only (resulting in an expected price 
approximately equal to Profiti(2)) and the incumbent would win the second license at the reserve 
price PMIN. In contrast, in scenario A there would be no competition at all, resulting in revenues 
2PMIN. Hence, in the realistic case that there are small entry costs, the set-aside would increase 
both efficiency and revenues. 
C: In this case, there are two possible outcomes. The unrestricted license will be acquired 
either by the incumbent or by two regional entrants. The two auction prices will be Profit(2) and 
2·ProfitR(3, Open) if the incumbent wins, or Profit(3) and 2·ProfitR(3, Open) if the regional 
entrants win. The second case occurs when 2·ProfitR(3, Open) > 2·Profit(2) − Profit(3). 
Therefore in both cases the revenues are higher in scenario C than in scenario B.   15
The analysis of scenario C is clearly oversimplified since we assumed that the profits per 
license with the open access requirement will be the same as on the license without that 
requirement. That is unlikely. In fact, if the profits from the open access license are higher than 
from a closed license, one would expect the licensees in scenario B to offer open access 
voluntarily (making the auction design relevant only by communicating to potential regional 
entrants that this is indeed going to be the market outcome). 
Nevertheless, even if the profits from the open access license are strictly lower than from an 
unrestricted license, making the revenue from this particular license lower in scenario C than in 
B (with only restrictions on the incumbent not to win all licenses), it can be more than 
compensated by the increased revenue from the other licenses. 
We can extend all these scenarios to allow two incumbents instead of one. In that case, in 
scenario A the two incumbents would split the licenses at a price at most Profit(3), assuming 
realistically that the marginal value of an additional license is decreasing (see Grimm, Riedel and 
Wolfstetter (2003)). In scenario B the first license would be sold to a new entrant at the price = 
Profit(3) and the second license would be sold to an incumbent also at price = Profit(3) since the 
incumbents would compete for it. Again the set-aside for a new entrant leads to weakly higher 
revenues and strictly higher efficiency. In scenario C the prices would be Profit(3) and Profit(3) 
if one of the incumbents wins the second license, or Profit(4) and 2·ProfitR(4, Open) otherwise 
since then the competition will be between the regional entrants. Simple algebra shows that in 
the second case the total revenues will be strictly higher than 2·Profit(3), so that even though the 
open-access license would sell for less than in scenario A, the gain from the competition for the 
regional licenses more than compensates to increase overall revenues from the auction. 
Summing up, an open-access license creates auction revenues as high, and in some cases 
strictly higher, than any of the other two scenarios.
11 
Model 4: Bidding credits for small firms 
For simplicity, we return to the scenario of one license and one incumbent (having one 
license) and many potential entrants. Suppose the auctioneer offers bidding credits of x percent 
(for simplicity, for all new entrants), so that if the winning price is p then a new entrant would 
pay only (1-x)·p. Then a potential new entrant is willing to bid up to 
p = Profit(2)/(1-x) > Profit(2). 
Bidding credits have two possible impacts on the auction outcome, depending on whether the 
term 2·Profit(1) − Profit(2)·(1+1/(1-x)) is positive or negative. 
If it is positive, then the incumbent will still win the auction because it is willing to bid up to 
p = 2·Profit(1) − Profit(2) while an entrant is willing to bid only up to Profit(2)/(1-x)). The price 
will be Profit(2)/(1-x) and the market will remain concentrated. In that case even though the 
bidding credits do not help improve the market allocation, they do increase revenue from the 
auction. 
                                                 
11 One can also introduce costs to entry and some asymmetry across bidders to incorporate the effects from Model 2 
into this model and show that the open access requirement is again superior to the unrestricted-auction design.   16
If the term above is negative then a new entrant will win the auction and pay a price net of 
the bidding credit that is [2·Profit(1) − Profit(2)]·(1-x) > Profit(1)·(1-x). In that case revenues go 
down (to see this, note that the revenues are decreasing in x in this case and at x such that the 
incumbent and entrant are willing to bid up to exactly the same price, the revenues are Profit(2), 
so the same as under no bidding credits). However, in return the market structure is more 
efficient. As before, if there are costs of participating in the auction then auction revenues could 
go up in both cases. 
Combining the two cases of Model 4, we summarize as follows. If the FCC is interested in 
finding a balance between maximizing revenues and promoting competition, then moderate sized 
bidding credits are a win-win situation: they increase revenues without worsening the market 
structure. Even higher bidding credits promote post-auction competition, but possibly at a 
detriment to revenue.
12 
As usual, there are many caveats to this analysis. We discuss two. First, one can be worried 
that a new entrant would use the bidding credit to obtain the license and then resell it (directly or 
indirectly via a 100% wholesale contract) to the incumbent. Suppose that the incumbent can 
create an affiliate or “front” that would follow such strategy and suppose x is small enough so 
that without such strategy the incumbent would win the auction at a price Profit(2)/(1-x). Instead, 
it could drop out of the auction and let the “front” win the auction at the same price, but capture 
back the bidding credit. In this way the incumbent would still end up with the license and pay 
only Profit(2). Such a devious strategy can undo any benefits of increased competition. 
Analogous front-bidding strategies can threaten the benefits of creating the open-access network. 
We think that such a strategy can be successfully defeated by appropriate service rules on the 
operation of the open-access network. 
Second, bidding credits are usually not for new entrants but rather for small businesses and 
other designated entities. As long as the credits provide just an additional competitive pressure 
but have a small probability of affecting the final allocation, this distinction does not matter. But, 
in case some entrants are more efficient than others and the bidding credits treat them 
asymmetrically, there is a threat that bidding credits would tilt the allocation of the license to a 
new entrant that is not the most efficient among them. 
Summing up, bidding credits in moderate amounts improve competition in the auction, but 
they should not be so large as to be decisive in the allocation of the licenses. 
                                                 
12 Milgrom (2004, p. 237) shows another model in which moderate bidding credits improve revenues in the auction.   17
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